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The origins and implications of contractual estoppel 
 
Jo Braithwaite* 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Compared to other forms of estoppel, the requirements for contractual estoppel are 
light. If parties have concluded a binding contract containing an acknowledgement of a 
certain state of affairs, subject to statute and public policy, contractual estoppel will 
prevent the maker of the statement from "asserting in litigation"1 that the opposite was 
true. In the pivotal case of Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,2 an 
investor signed terms which included a description of his investment and an 
acknowledgement that he had read and understood the documentation. The Court of 
Appeal held that, because of contractual estoppel, the investor was precluded from 
arguing that he had been induced into the agreement by a misrepresentation as to the 
nature of his investment.  
 
Since Peekay and the subsequent consolidation of the doctrine in Springwell Navigation Corp 
v JP Morgan Chase Bank3 there has been no stopping contractual estoppel. In particular, it 
has become a regular feature in disputes arising from the latest financial crisis, typically as 
one of several reasons why sophisticated counterparties fail in multifaceted claims against 
their banks. These financial markets cases have catalysed the development of the 
doctrine, as well as the debate around it. On the one hand, the courts have now clearly 
confirmed that, as a matter of freedom of contract, parties are able to agree that they are 
contracting on the basis of a certain (for example, "representation-free")4 state of affairs, 
and as a matter of contractual certainty, the courts will not disrupt this approach. A short 
overview of the doctrine as it now stands is set out in Part II of the paper. On the other 
hand, these recent sightings of contractual estoppel have started to generate concerns. 
These concerns may be thought of as falling into two groups, and they are the subject of 
the remainder of the paper. 
 
The first set of concerns is about labelling this doctrine as an estoppel. One leading 
textbook describes it as "anomalous" and "not an estoppel",5 while a recent High Court 
decision refers to the term as "a convenient label" and to the doctrine as an estoppel 
"(so-called)".6 Contractual estoppel may, it seems, be nothing of the sort. These concerns 
reflect the fact that, unlike other forms of estoppel, including the evidential estoppel 
considered in EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan,7 there is no requirement of 
detrimental reliance before contractual estoppel binds a representor to his statement of 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science.   
1 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] EWCA Civ 386; [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at 
[70], per Chadwick L.J.  
2 [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, appealed from Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2005] 
EWHC 830 (Comm); [2005] 2 C.L.C. 111.  
3 [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705. 
4 Mears Ltd v Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 639; [2013] C.P. Rep. 39, at [17]. 
5 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at pp. 90-91 and 315.  
6 Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm); [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [309] 
and [322].  
7 [1999] All E.R. (D) 1163; [1998-99] Info. T.L.R. 384; Official Transcript.   
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fact. Some commentators use this as basis attacking the substance of the doctrine. Thus, 
for Professor McMeel, the argument that contractual estoppel is an "illegitimate species 
of estoppel" is one of several reasons why the doctrine is a "myth", which should be 
"exploded" by the Supreme Court at the first opportunity.8 However, even if this is not a 
new form of estoppel,  it does not follow that this doctrine lacks valid means to reach the 
same ends. For this reason, it is submitted that the question of whether this doctrine has 
been mislabelled should be addressed after considering the origins and content of the 
doctrine. Accordingly, Part III below begins by considering the pivotal cases. It explains 
that the doctrine is a hybrid of authority and principle, and that, over time, it has become 
a well-established and distinct rule based on freedom of contract. Part III concludes that, 
apart from intensifying the challenge for those attempting to set up some sort of unified 
law of estoppel, in practice, little now turns on the label "estoppel".       
 
The second set of concerns about contractual estoppel relates to its implications. As 
discussed in the first section of Part IV, the English courts have consistently held that 
the widely-used risk allocation provisions found in Mandate Letters9 and Information 
Memorandums10 in the syndicated loans context, and in derivatives contracts11 and in the 
client documentation used by investment banks may give rise to an estoppel so that 
defendants avoid responsibility for actual events. While there is some room for debate 
about the implications of contractual estoppel for financial agreements of this type, and 
about the applicability of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ("UCTA"), an arguably 
more pressing concern is about contagion from the financial markets case law into what 
Christopher Clarke J. called "everyday contracts made with consumers or between 
businesses great and small".12 Accordingly, the second section of Part IV considers cases 
applying Springwell. It shows that contractual estoppel is now being argued in more 
diverse contexts. In a recent case, for example, an employer argued that an employee's 
contractual acknowledgement that a restrictive covenant was fair should stop him from 
arguing the reverse. Drawing on these cases, Part IV of the paper explains the potential 
of contractual estoppel to disrupt the status quo regarding promises of good faith and 
reasonable endeavours, and the capacity of a statutory body, but it also finds evidence of 
both "internal" and "external" limits being carefully applied by the courts. It concludes 
that these limits will be tested and developed further as draftsmen catch on to 
contractual estoppel.  
 
 
II. Overview 
 
Contractual estoppel arises when parties have concluded a binding contract containing an 
acknowledgement of a state of affairs. The maker of the statement is thereby estopped 
from "asserting in litigation"13 that the opposite was true, whether or not it actually was.  
 
                                                 
8 G. McMeel, "Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: The myth of contractual estoppel" 
[2011] L.M.C.L.Q. 185, at p. 206 and 207. 
9 Barclays Bank v Svizera Holdings BV [2014] EWHC 1020 (Comm); [2015] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 788.  
10 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm); [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
123.  
11 See, e.g., Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2012] EWCA Civ 1049; [2012] All E.R. 
(D) 317 (Jul), considering, inter alia, section 9(a) of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
("ISDA") Master Agreement, at [774]. 
12 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [305]. 
13 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [70].  
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One set of commentators concludes that "[f]ollowing the logic of the cases where 
contractual estoppel has been considered, it appears that any representation of fact made 
in a contract may be given effect by the operation of the new doctrine."14 In practice, 
however, the principal focus of the case law to date has been statements of past and 
present fact along the lines that no advice or representations have been given by one 
party to another. There were several examples in the extensive "Relevant Provisions" 
litigated in Springwell, including the statement that no advice had been provided by the 
bank to the investor.15 Furthermore, in a recent High Court decision, the judge could 
"see of no reason of authority, principle or policy" that the doctrine should be confined 
to statements about a present or past state of affairs.16 Such provisions are now common 
in commercial documentation. The main implication of this type of statement giving rise 
to an estoppel is that the maker becomes precluded from asserting certain claims, 
including, commonly, for misrepresentation. This strictly upholds the terms of the 
bargain, but it is also one of the reasons that contractual estoppel has been harshly 
criticised by some commentators.17  
 
Like other estoppels including estoppel by representation,18 contractual estoppel operates 
subject to statute and public policy. So, for example, the decision in Lowe v Lombank19 
that a consumer was not bound by a contractual statement that she had not made the 
purpose of her purchase of a car known was subsequently explained in Springwell as a 
result of the protections afforded by the Hire Purchase Act 1938. To the extent that 
statements limit or exclude, rather than prevent, claims for misrepresentation, section 3 
of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 will apply, so that statements have to meet the 
requirement of reasonableness in UCTA. In practice, when both parties are commercial 
entities, such terms seem inevitably to be found reasonable.20 For clear reasons of public 
policy, contractual estoppel will not arise in the context of fraud or, as has been held at 
first instance, in the case of a restrictive covenant in an employment contract.21  
 
The authorities are clear that contractual estoppel is, at the very least, a "separate 
doctrine" to estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.22 Because of the 
presence of a contract between the parties, it has been held that there is no need to show 
"some other mechanism" like unconscionability or detrimental reliance in order to make 
contractual estoppel enforceable.23 As a result, however, contractual estoppel will wholly 
depend on the validity of the contract. For example, it will not be available if the contract 
is ultra vires as regards one of the parties, and therefore void. For the same reason, 
                                                 
14 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at p. 140.  
15 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm); [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 
(Jun), at [497]-[535].  
16 Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [307].  
17 See, e.g., G. McMeel, "Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: The myth of contractual 
estoppel" [2011] L.M.C.L.Q. 185. 
18 As discussed in S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), at, p. 183.  
19
 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196; [1960] 1 All E.R. 611. 
20 Applying s 3(2) of UCTA, Chadwick L.J. stated that "experienced businessmen representing substantial 
companies of equal bargaining power" …  "should be taken to be the best judge of the question whether 
the terms of the agreement are reasonable". Watford Electronics v Sanderson [2001] EWCA Civ 317; [2001] 1 
All E.R. (Comm) 696, at [55]. See further discussion of UCTA reasonableness in Part IV below.  
21 Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd v Evans [2014] EWHC 2 (Ch); [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217, discussed further in 
Part IV below.  
22 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [177]. 
23 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [177]. 
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contractual estoppel is also vulnerable to misrepresentation as to the effect of the 
documents.24 In the context of a recent summary judgement application, it was held to be 
arguable that a bank could not rely on estoppel arising from a disclaimer signed by 
reason of a dishonest representation.25 In such cases, it may be possible to establish 
estoppel by representation instead. This type of estoppel does not require a contractual 
relationship, but it does require that additional criteria are met, including that the 
representee has acted to his detriment in reliance upon the representation.26 
 
 
III. Origins 
 
Contractual estoppel has never been considered by the Supreme Court (or House of 
Lords). Peekay is the pivotal Court of Appeal case, in the sense that it defined the 
doctrine as it is now widely applied. Springwell subsequently confirmed and consolidated 
the doctrine. Both the exhaustive first instance decision in Springwell and the unanimous 
Court of Appeal decision upholding it have been widely relied upon in the subsequent 
authorities. This part of the paper examines the origins and the content of the doctrine 
and, on that basis, concludes by considering how it should be labelled.   
  
1. The pivotal case of Peekay 
 
In Peekay, at [56], Moore-Bick L.J. explained contractual estoppel as follows: 
 
 "There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree that a 
certain state of affairs should form the basis for the transaction, whether it be the 
case or not. For example, it may be desirable to settle a disagreement as to an 
existing state of affairs in order to establish a clear basis for the contract itself and 
its subsequent performance. Where parties express an agreement of that kind in a 
contractual document neither can subsequently deny the existence of the facts 
and matters upon which they have agreed, at least so far as concern those aspects 
of their relationship to which the agreement was directed. The contract itself 
gives rise to an estoppel: see Colchester Borough Council v Smith [1991] Ch 448, 
affirmed on appeal [1992] Ch 421."  
 
In Peekay, an investor with "considerable investment experience"27 purchased a product 
described as a "structured US Dollar hedged Russian Treasury bill deposit" from ANZ 
Bank. Critically, repayment under this product was contractually linked to the 
performance of a Russian government bond (a "GKO"), but the product gave the 
investor no proprietary rights in GKOs. This was significant because it meant that, in the 
event of a sovereign default, investors would have no standing as regards the issuer, and 
therefore no control over how the investment was liquidated.28 The Final Terms and 
Conditions ("FTCs") of the product set out the details of the product accurately. The 
investor signed and returned the FTCs, along with a Risk Disclosure Statement ("RDS") 
though he had not read either document. Before signing, he received "inconsistent" 
information from the bank about the rights attached to the product. In August 1998 the 
                                                 
24 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [57] and [60]. For 
example, see Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co. [1951] 1 K.B. 805; [1951] 1 All E.R. 631. 
25 Deutsche Bank v Unitech [2013] EWHC 2793 (Comm); [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 268, at [157]. 
26 Lowe v Lombank [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196, at 205.  
27 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [2].  
28 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [6].  
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Russian government announced a moratorium on its obligations under GKOs, and the 
investment became virtually worthless.29  
 
The investor claimed damages under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act, on the 
basis that the product had been sold as one offering proprietary rights in GKOs. The 
investor was successful at first instance, with the judge finding that the investor was 
induced to purchase the product by the bank's informal representations. The Court of 
Appeal, however, unanimously upheld the bank's appeal, placing far greater weight than 
the judge on the FTCs. It found that the FTCs were clear and definitive as to the nature 
of the product, and, while prior "informal"30 information provided to the investor was 
inconsistent, it was also provided "innocently"31 and on a "rather rough and ready"32 
basis. As Moore-Bick L.J. put it, "the true position appeared clearly from the terms of the 
very contract which the claimant says it was induced to enter by the 
misrepresentation."33As a result, the Court of Appeal found that investor was induced to 
purchase the product by his own assumptions, and not by the bank's previous 
statements.  
 
Contractual estoppel was raised by the appellants in Peekay as an alternative argument. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeal was required to decide whether, by signing the RDS, the 
investor was "precluded as a matter of contract from contending that it did not 
understand the true nature of the investment".34 The argument focused on two terms of 
the RDS, which were as follows: 
 
 "You should also ensure that you fully understand the nature of the transaction 
and contractual relationship into which you are entering."  
 
and:  
 "The issuer assumes that the customer is aware of the risks and practices 
described herein, and that prior to each transaction the customer has determined 
that such transaction is suitable for him."  
 
It was also relevant that immediately above the space for signature on the RDS, there 
was the following statement: 
 
 "[Client] confirms it has read and understood the terms of the Emerging Markets 
Risk Disclosure Statement as set out above."  
 
Moore-Bick L.J. found that by signing the RDS, the investor was bound by the third 
statement above, confirming he had read and understood the terms. By returning the 
signed FTC and RDS, he offered to contract with the bank on the terms therein and his 
offer was accepted by the bank implementing his instructions. As a result, the contract 
between investor and bank included the first and second terms above. This meant that it 
was not open to the investor to say he did not understand the nature of the transaction 
described in the FTCs, or to say that he was induced to contract by an inconsistent 
earlier statement by the bank. In short, contractual estoppel prevented the investor 
                                                 
29 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [50]-[58]. 
30 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [52]. 
31 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [45]. 
32 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [25]. 
33 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [43].  
34 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [58]. 
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avoiding the effect of terms of a contract by arguing in court that the opposite was true 
(i.e., that he had not read or understood the terms). Collins L.J. and Chadwick L.J. 
concurred, with the latter providing a substantive judgment in which he gave three 
reasons for his decision, one of which was that: 
 
 "[the confirmation in the RDS], as it seems to me, operated as a contractual 
estoppel to prevent Peekay from asserting in litigation that it had not, in fact read 
and understood the Risk Disclosure Statement." 35 
 
2. Springwell  
 
Springwell is the second landmark decision on contractual estoppel, which, over the course 
of the first instance and Court of Appeal decisions, confirmed and developed the 
doctrine established by Peekay.  
 
As in Peekay, this investor's claims arose out of the August 1998 default by the Russian 
state on its GKOs. In Springwell, the investor's claims were heard in two parts, addressing 
pre-default and post-default claims. The investor's pre-default claims against the bank 
were very broad-ranging, including claims for "excessive profits", as well as for "breach 
of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent mis-statement and/or under 
section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act in respect of the loss of the value of the 
investment portfolio acquired through its dealings with Chase".36 Contractual estoppel 
was one of many issues considered during the trial of the pre-default claims but it was of 
significance, however, because of the potentially sweeping effects of the "Relevant 
Provisions" of the documentation of a "very broad nature"37 entered into by the parties.38 
Against this background, Springwell made three particularly important contributions to the 
development of the doctrine of contractual estoppel.  
 
(a) Distinction from other forms of estoppel 
 
Springwell clearly confirmed, as had been found in Peekay,39 that contractual estoppel is a 
separate doctrine to other forms of estoppel, including the "evidential estoppel" 
discussed by Chadwick L.J. in EA Grimstead40 and in Watford Electronics v Sanderson CFL.41 
The outcome in EA Grimstead demonstrates very clearly why this distinction matters, and 
why it is hopeless to argue that contractual estoppel should have other requirements 
bolted on to make it a "true" estoppel.  
 
In EA Grimstead, a share sale agreement contained two acknowledgements of non-
reliance on representations and warranties, with the exception of those contained in the 
                                                 
35 Peekay Intermark [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [70].  
36 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [4]-[9].  
37 Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [476]. 
38 Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at fn 104 details the extensive documentation 
relied on by the bank.  
39 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [57], considers 
separately contractual estoppel and estoppel by representation. Peekay was relied upon as authority for this 
point in Trident Turboprop (Dublin) v First Flight Couriers [2008] EWHC 1686 (Comm); [2009] 1 All E.R. 
(Comm) 16, at [35] where Aikens J. states that "I am quite satisfied, having looked at the cases, that the two 
forms of 'estoppel' are different." In fn 9 to this decision, Aikens J. indicates that since argument, he has 
read the judgment of Gloster J. in Springwell and agrees with her analysis of this point.  
40 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1998-99] Info. T.L.R. 384.    
41 [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 696, at [40]. 
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agreement. The Court of Appeal found that no false oral representations had been made 
by the vendors. However, had such representation had been made, it was held that the 
clauses may be "capable of operating as an evidential estoppel".42 Applying Lowe v 
Lombank43 (discussed further below), the Court went on to consider whether the vendor 
had proved the three requirements of evidential estoppel, being (i) that the non-reliance 
statements given by the purchaser were clear and unequivocal, (ii) that the purchaser had 
intended that the vendor should act upon those statements, and (iii) that the vendor 
believed that the statements were true and had acted on them. Chadwick L.J. (writing for 
the unanimous Court) concluded that while points (i) and (ii) were met, (iii) would be 
problematic for the vendor because, having made representations (a pre-condition of the 
estoppel point being relevant), "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that [the vendor] did 
so in order to persuade [the purchaser] to agree to the purchase".44 In that case, the 
vendor would be precluded from arguing that he believed the purchaser's statement of 
non-reliance was true, and he could not rely on any estoppel arising from those 
statements.  
 
Springwell, on the other hand, clearly confirmed that contractual estoppel does not require 
detrimental reliance,45 but arises on the basis of the contract alone. Contractual estoppel 
therefore avoids the "insuperable difficulties" caused by the evidential estoppel 
requirements in the context of non-reliance cases.46 Of course, estoppel by representation 
may arise as well as, or instead of, contractual estoppel, should the requirements be met.47 
This may be useful if, for example, the underlying contract itself is void.  
 
The Court of Appeal also confirmed in Springwell that contractual estoppel is distinct 
from "estoppel by convention", which would require that the party wishing to rely on a 
statement shows that it would be unconscionable for the other party to go back on the 
assumed state of affairs.48 It had been submitted by the investor in Springwell that any 
estoppel in that case should be governed by "considerations of justice and equity". These 
arguments were dealt with decisively by the Court of Appeal, which held that contractual 
estoppel is "a separate doctrine"; it is based on the contract between the parties, so no 
other "mechanism" such as unconscionability is required; and these other requirements 
are "irrelevant" to contractual estoppel.49  
 
(b) Is Peekay sound?   
 
It was also submitted in Springwell that Peekay itself was not good law. More specifically, it 
was argued that the parts of Peekay addressing contractual estoppel were obiter, or 
alternatively per incuriam. After a detailed review of the authorities, these various attacks 
on Peekay were robustly dismissed both at first instance and by the Court of Appeal.  
 
                                                 
42 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1998-99] Info. T.L.R. 384, at 411. 
43
 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196. 
44 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd [1998-99] Info. T.L.R. 384, at 412. 
45 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [558]-[563].  
46 Watford Electronics v Sanderson [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 696,, at [40]. 
47 Peekay Intermark v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2006] 1 C.L.C. 582, at [57]. 
48 Estoppel by convention was deployed by the Court of Appeal in the RASCALS case as a justification for 
the transfer of property in an automated intra-group repo transaction. Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) [2011] EWCA Civ 1544; [2012] 2 B.C.L.C. 151, at [106]-[124], as discussed in M. Bridge and J. 
Braithwaite, "Private law and financial crises" (October 2013) 13(2) J.C.L.S. 361.  
49 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [177]-[178].  
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The obiter argument was dismissed promptly in Springwell, as it was by Christopher 
Clarke J. after his detailed review of the authorities in Raiffeisen.50 In both instances it was 
held that this was one of the grounds on which the investor's claim was dismissed by the 
Court of Appeal in Peekay. It is curious, therefore, to see the two key paragraphs of 
Moore-Bick L.J.'s judgment in Peekay (one of which is reproduced at the start of this part 
of the paper) still described as "obiter" in the 2012 edition of an estoppel textbook.51  
 
The per incuriam arguments merit more consideration, because they were based on the 
fact that the Court of Appeal in Peekay did not cite or refer to the 1960 Court of Appeal 
decision in Lowe v Lombank.52 In Springwell, Aikens L.J. noted that Lowe was the sole 
authority or "legal principle" cited by counsel for the investor in support of the 
proposition that parties cannot agree in a contract "that X is the case even if both know 
that it is not so".53 This raises the questions of exactly what Lowe decided, whether the 
decision should be narrowly read, and the implications of its absence from the decision 
in Peekay.  
 
In Lowe a consumer bought a car on hire purchase terms. The consumer signed, but did 
not read, the hire purchase agreement. She was assured by the salesman that the car was 
"in perfect or almost perfect condition". Later, the consumer signed a delivery receipt 
which stated: 
  
"[…] I/We acknowledge and agree that I/We have read the hire-purchase 
agreement made between us and fully understand the terms and conditions 
thereof before signing." 
 
In fact, the car was not roadworthy. The consumer sought damages for breach of the 
implied condition of fitness for purpose under section 8(2) of the Hire-Purchase Act 
1938. By way of a defence, the hire purchase company argued that they were acting 
"purely as bankers" and had given no express or implied warranty about the vehicle. 
Further, they argued that the consumer was estopped from relying on any such implied 
condition.  
 
Clause 8 of the hire purchase agreement purported to exclude certain conditions and 
warranties implied under the Hire-Purchase Acts 1938 and 1954, but the judge and Court 
of Appeal agreed that it did not exclude conditions implied by section 8(2).54 The Court 
of Appeal also agreed with the judge that in this case the consumer had "plainly made it 
known to the defendants by implication" what she needed the car for, namely "the 
purpose of driving about". As a result, there was an implied condition to that effect in 
the hire purchase agreement.  
 
At first instance, however, the judge went on to find that the consumer was estopped by 
the statements in the delivery receipt from relying on the defects to make a claim for a 
breach of an implied condition. Diplock J., giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
                                                 
50 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [241]. 
51 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at p. 139.  
52
 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196. 
53 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [144].  
54 Lowe v Lombank [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196, at 203.  
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started by considering the "curiously drafted"55 clause 9(ii) of the hire purchase terms, 
which stated that:  
  
"The hirer further acknowledges and agrees that he has not made known to the 
owners expressly or by implication the particular purpose for which the goods 
are required, and that the goods are reasonably fit for the purpose for which they 
are in fact required."  
 
He found that the acknowledgement or "representation" by the consumer could only 
operate as estoppel by representation, "preventing the plaintiff from asserting the 
contrary". The judge went on to note that the defendants had not taken this point, which 
the court presumed was because there was no evidence that the defendants believed in 
the truth of the representation. Secondly, the judge considered the effect of the wording 
that the hirer also agreed that she had not made the purpose known. The defendants 
argued that this was an "express promise" by the consumer, which negated any "implied 
promise" about fitness for purpose. In a much-cited passage, Diplock J. dismissed the 
possibility that such an "agreement" could:  
 
"convert a statement as to past facts, known by both parties to be untrue, into a 
contractual obligation, which is essentially a promise by the promisor to the 
promisee that acts will be done in the future or that facts exist at the time of the 
promise or will exist in the future."56  
 
Diplock J. found that this statement (and that in the delivery receipt, which did not form 
part of the contract) might give rise to an estoppel by representation but, on the facts, 
this argument was not available to the defendants. In sum, the defendants in Lowe failed 
to meet the evidentiary burden necessary to show an estoppel by representation and 
could not sustain an argument based on contractual estoppel. The hirer knew the 
purpose intended for the car, and this was not affected by clause 9(ii) or the delivery 
receipt.  
 
Lowe has been considered in detail three times over the course of the development of the 
law of contractual estoppel, though, as noted, not in Peekay. This analysis is found at first 
instance and appellate level in Springwell and, in between those two decisions, in Raiffeisen. 
Though for somewhat different reasons, on none of these occasions was Lowe found to 
be binding authority for the proposition that an agreement as to past facts can never 
amount to contractual estoppel. The Court of Appeal in Springwell found that Lowe was to 
be read narrowly. Specifically, it disagreed with Christopher Clarke J.'s statement in 
Raiffeisen that Lowe did not hinge on section 8(3) of the Hire Purchase Act. Aikens L.J. 
stated "I think that is precisely what it did".57 Clause 9(ii) purported to exclude an implied 
condition and therefore, under the statutory scheme, it would have had to be brought to 
the attention of the consumer. As the defendants failed to do this, the term of the hire 
purchase agreement was ineffective. In light of this, the remarks of Diplock J. as to 
estoppel were "not, in my view, necessary for either part of the decision of the case".58 In 
this respect, the Court of Appeal agreed with the discussion of Lowe at first instance in 
Springwell, though on that occasion, the judge went on to suggest that in Lowe, the "so-
                                                 
55 Lowe [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196, at 204.  
56 Lowe [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196, at 204.  
57 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [151].  
58 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [152].  
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called "agreement"" could be seen "as no more than a sham".59 For these reasons, Lowe 
found not to be binding authority which needed to be addressed in Peekay.60  
 
In the alternative, if Lowe did decide that estoppel could not arise in these circumstances, 
Christopher Clarke J. held that it would be wrong, or itself per incuriam, because it failed 
to address the Court of Appeal decisions in Burrough's Adding Machine Ltd v Aspinall and 
Colchester Borough Council v Smith.61 This was confirmed in Springwell, where Aikens L.J. 
described these authorities as "a series of cases which support the proposition that 
parties can agree that a state of affairs will be the basis of their contractual dealings with 
one another."62 The former case held that a salesman was bound by a statement of 
accounts prepared by a company, though he knew them to be incorrect. This was 
because of a term in the contract between him and the company, whereby the statement 
was deemed to be correct unless the salesman objected within 30 days of receipt. The 
latter case, which cited the former, concerned a tenant farmer's settlement with his 
council, whereby he agreed that he had not obtained any interest in a section of land by 
adverse possession. At first instance, Ferris J cited a reference in the leading textbook to 
estoppel "by express contract"63 and held the farmer was estopped from going back on 
this statement. The Court of Appeal confirmed this outcome, on the basis that the 
agreement was a bona fide compromise of the dispute.  
 
These authorities have been criticised for not providing a comprehensive basis for the 
doctrine of contractual estoppel, not least because of the particular factual contexts in 
which both decisions were reached.64 But the point is not that they justify contractual 
estoppel as we know it, but that the authorities, in conjunction with the analysis of Lowe, 
and the application of principle (discussed next), provide the foundations for the 
subsequent development of this area of law in Peekay. Peekay was, in turn, confirmed as 
binding authority in both Raiffeisen and in Springwell, and even at the time of the Court of 
Appeal decision it had "now been followed in a large number of first instance cases 
[…]".65 Accordingly, in Springwell, it was held that "[t]he correct analysis must be the same 
as that in Peekay."66 
 
                                                 
59 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm); [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 
(Jun), at [550].  
60 The decisions in Springwell and Raiffeisen also state that the composition of the Court of Appeal in Peekay 
was relevant in evaluating whether that decision was per incuriam. For example, Christopher Clarke J. 
notes that Moore-Bick L.J. "referred to Grimstead v McGarrigan (which proceeded on Lowe v Lombank lines) 
and Chadwick L.J. gave the leading judgment in Grimstead and Watford Electronics v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] 
1 All E.R. (Comm) 696, [2002] F.S.R. 299. The court must necessarily have had the Lowe v Lombank type of 
estoppel in mind …" Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at 
[242]. 
61 See Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [255] discussing Burrough's Adding Machine 
Ltd v Aspinall (1925) 41 T.L.R. 276, CA and Colchester Borough Council v Smith [1992] Ch 421, CA;  [1992] 2 
All E.R. 561. 
62 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [156].  
63 Colchester Borough Council v Smith [1991] Ch 448;, at 493, citing G. Spencer Bower and A. Turner, Estoppel 
by Representation, 3rd edn. (London: Butterworths Law, 1977).  
64 G. McMeel, "Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: The myth of contractual estoppel" 
[2011] L.M.C.L.Q. 185, at 199.  
65 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [169] and Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [255] with Christopher Clarke J. concluding 
that "I believe that I should follow the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Peekay, which has itself 
been followed in several subsequent first instance decisions … " 
66 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [170]. 
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To conclude, the remarks of Diplock J. in the consumer case of Lowe are the only 
authority which is cited in either the case law or in the literature as directly challenging 
the development of the doctrine of contractual estoppel. On three occasions Lowe has 
been closely scrutinised by the courts, including by the Court of Appeal in Springwell. 
Each of these decisions has held unequivocally that Lowe is not authority for such a 
challenge to contractual estoppel, and that Peekay is good law, despite not citing or 
referencing Lowe. At the same time, the pivotal parts of Peekay have uniformly been 
found to be "consistent with principle and authority"67 and have been widely followed, 
without any further challenge on the basis of Lowe.68 For these reasons, it is submitted 
that the statements of Moore-Bick L.J. in Peekay are binding authority as to the operation 
of contractual estoppel, were correctly followed in Springwell and the subsequent cases, 
and should be upheld, if they are considered by the Supreme Court.  
 
(c) Principle 
 
In Springwell, Aikens L.J. first considered contractual estoppel "from principle",69 before 
evaluating the authorities. Later in the same judgment, (as discussed above) Peekay was 
confirmed as good law on the basis that it was "consistent with principle and authority".70 
Both statements confirm what is evident across the pivotal judgments, which is that 
contractual estoppel arises as much from principle as it does from the authorities.  
 
The underlying principle being referred to here is freedom of contract. As the Privy 
Council put in recently (in a case concerning estoppel by deed) "[p]arties are ordinarily 
free to contract on whatever terms they choose and the court's role is to enforce them."71 
In our particular context, subject to "some principle of law or statute to the contrary"72 
freedom of contract has been held to require, first, that commercial parties are free to 
devise their own "contractual matrix"73 in order to allocate risk as they see fit, and 
secondly, that the resulting bargain will be certain, in the sense that a contract should be 
immune from a party's attempts to deny it later. In other words, contractual estoppel 
protects the parties' autonomy to define "the true nature of their agreement"74 by 
defending acknowledgements given in binding contracts.  
 
By rooting the discussions of contractual estoppel in freedom of contract, the courts 
have located the doctrine within one of the most pervasive and powerful traditions in 
English commercial law. This has several implications. In the first instance, it facilitates 
judicial reasoning by allowing analogies to be drawn with other areas of commercial life. 
So, for example, terms in marine insurance contracts were cited by Aikens L.J. to support 
the finding that there is no reason in principle why parties should not be free to "agree to 
assume that a certain state of affairs is the case at the time the contract is concluded or 
has been so in the past, even if that is not the case […]".75  
 
                                                 
67 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [169]. 
68 Lowe v Lombank [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196 appears to have been cited in only one reported case since 
Springwell, namely ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 1070 
(Comm); [2012] 2 C.L.C. 48, where it was distinguished.   
69 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [143].  
70 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [169]. 
71 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2013] UKPC 22; [2014] A.C. 436, at [46].  
72 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [143].  
73 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [482]. 
74 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [317].  
75 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [143].  
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Drawing another analogy, a recent Privy Council case about estoppel by deed may also 
be seen as informative as regards the development of contractual estoppel. In Prime Sight 
Ltd  v Lavarello76 the Privy Council considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal in 
Gibraltar involving a deed of assignment, registered with the Registrar of Land Titles. In 
the deed, the assignor (the Official Trustee) acknowledged payment of a sum from the 
assignee (a company). Both parties knew that this recital of fact was untrue; no sum had 
been paid. The question was whether the statement in the deed estopped the assignor 
from asserting that the company still owed the debt. Having reviewed the authorities on 
estoppel by deed and drawing on the authorities on estoppel by convention, the Privy 
Council concluded that both doctrines allow parties to assume a state of facts or law for 
their own purposes, and that this accords with earlier cases, and "more fundamentally, it 
accords with the principle of party autonomy which underlies the common law of 
contract".77 On this basis, the Privy Council held that the Official Receiver was not able 
to claim that the deed of sale ought to be enforced while seeking "to discard as bogus the 
part of the document which treats the price as paid… there is no principled basis for 
having it both ways, by splitting the contractual provision of the deed in that manner".78 
This decision clearly demonstrates that freedom of contract serves as a common 
denominator for different types of estoppel, and that estoppel is regarded as a means of 
holding parties to their bargains. It is submitted that contractual estoppel clearly fits into 
this analysis, and that freedom of contract is likely to be of central importance if 
contractual estoppel is considered by the Supreme Court.  
 
The prominence given to freedom of contract in the pivotal cases also means that 
contractual estoppel may be understood as part of a wider trend. We know from the 
work of Professor Atiyah that freedom of contract is, in historical terms, pervasive but 
not static.79 Against this background, the emergence of contractual estoppel may be seen 
as part of a vigorous assertion of the principle freedom of contract that is evident across 
recent financial markets cases. Another example of this trend may be found in insolvency 
law. In 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the common law anti-deprivation 
principle rendered void a "flip" clause within complex securitisation documentation, 
which changed the ranking of two sets of secured creditors on the insolvency of one of 
them. As Lord Collins stated, giving one of the opinions in a unanimous judgment of the 
Supreme Court: 
 
"[d]espite statutory inroads, party autonomy is at the heart of English commercial 
law. Plainly there are limits to party autonomy in the field with which this appeal 
is concerned, not least because the interests of third party creditors will be 
involved. But, as Lord Neuberger stressed [2010] Ch 347, para 58, it is desirable 
that, so far as possible, the courts give effect to contractual terms which parties 
have agreed. And there is a particularly strong case for autonomy in cases of 
complex financial instruments such as those involved in this appeal."80  
 
Accordingly, and in keeping with a separate decision considering the anti-deprivation 
principle in the context of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) 
                                                 
76 [2014] A.C. 436. The link between this case and contractual estoppel is discussed in A. Trukhtanov, 
"Receipt clauses: From estoppel by deed to contractual estoppel" (2014) L.Q.R. 3.  
77 Prime Sight v Lavarello [2014] A.C. 436, at [46].  
78 Prime Sight [2014] A.C. 436, at [52].  
79 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 
80 Belmont Park Investment PTY Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and LBSF Inc [2011] UKSC 38; [2012] 
1 A.C. 383, at [103].  
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Master Agreement,81 the anti-deprivation principle was held not to apply to terms in a 
financial contract which are included for bona fide commercial reasons.  
 
This extract from Lord Collins' opinion highlights the relationship between the 
underlying subject-matter of financial markets cases like Belmont and reasoning which has 
vigorously asserted parties' freedom of contract. Notably, Lord Collins cites the 
complexity of the underlying instruments as providing a "particularly strong case for 
autonomy". This factor appears significant in the contractual estoppel cases too. As 
explained, the pivotal contractual estoppel cases involve relatively complex debt 
instruments, which were documented in detailed and extensive agreements between 
sophisticated parties. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the Court of Appeal 
in Springwell acknowledged the "commercial utility"82 of the Relevant Provisions. 
Contractual estoppel has continued to feature prominently in cases involving complex 
deals, having been found to arise from the relevant provisions of notes with embedded 
collateralised debt obligations,83 zero cost collars,84 and currency derivatives allegedly so 
complex that "the Bank required specialist proprietary software to understand and 
analyse them".85  
 
Indeed, it is submitted that financial markets cases exemplified by Springwell, and by first 
instance decisions like Titan Steel Wheels,  present a whole range of related factors that are 
linked but not limited to the complexity of the underlying deals, which help to explain 
why freedom of contract has flourished in this setting. These include the sophistication 
of the parties, their equality of bargaining power and their freedom of choice of 
counterparties,86 the fact that such parties are advised by lawyers, and that the 
documentation is professionally drafted and well-known across the markets.87 These 
factors also include the relative absence of regulation in such markets. This is evidenced 
by the private law basis of the various claims brought in cases like Springwell, and by the 
failure of several different attempts to argue that such parties should be protected by 
investor regulation because they fall into the definition of "private persons" for the 
purpose of pursuing an action for damages under section 150 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000.88  
 
In this context, an emphasis on freedom of contract seems obvious and consistent. 
Across various areas of law the courts have sought the same end of upholding 
professionally drafted and complex terms. However, as evidenced by the discussion 
earlier in this section, the effects of such decisions do not stay confined to specialist 
sectors, but develop the common law more broadly. Unlike the anti-deprivation 
principle, contractual estoppel is not qualified by requiring the courts to examine the 
                                                 
81 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch); [2011] 2 B.C.L.C. 120. 
82 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [143]-[144]. 
83 Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino SpA v Barclays Bank [2011] EWHC 484; [2011] 1 C.L.C. 
701. 
84 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2012] All E.R. (D) 317 (Jul). 
85 Titan Steel Wheels v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm); [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92, at [47] 
86 This is also relevant in certain cases outside the financial markets. See, for e.g.,  "Avrora is a vehicle for a 
particularly rich man and that it was under no economic imperative to deal with Christie's if it did not wish 
to." Avrora Fine Arts Investment v Christie, Manson & Woods [2010] EWHC 2198 (Ch); [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at 
[151]. 
87 See, for e.g., the discussion of the negotiations between clients and lawyers around the "Additional 
Representations" in the derivatives documentation in Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2015] 
Bus. L.R. D5, at [292].  
88 Titan Steel Wheels v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92, at [44]-[76] and Grant Estates Ltd v 
RBS [2012] CSOH 133; 2012 G.W.D. 29-588, at [43]-[62].  
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commercial good sense of the underlying provision. This means its potential to impact 
on "everyday" contracts is greater. These broader effects, and the limits to them, are 
considered further in Part IV below.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The most important point made in this part of the paper is that the pivotal cases of 
Peekay and Springwell clearly establish the origins and effects of contractual estoppel. 
These origins encompass the authorities and the principle of freedom of contract. It is 
also now clear that contractual estoppel is distinct and independent from other forms of 
estoppel, and does not require detrimental reliance or unconscionability; it arises solely 
by the "mechanism" of the contract. This has been soundly debated and unanimously 
held in two Court of Appeal decisions, as well as numerous first instance cases, and the 
pivotal cases have now been widely and consistently applied. As a result, this doctrine is 
now as established as it can be short of a decision of the Supreme Court.  
 
In Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. v Texas Commerce International Bank89 Lord 
Denning said that the "doctrine of estoppel is one of the most useful and flexible in the 
armoury of the law". The follow-up question arising from the discussion in this part is 
whether it is flexible enough to encompass contractual estoppel, as it has now been 
defined. It should be noted first, however, that unlike hotly contested labels like "floating 
charge", this is not a label which comes with automatic and drastic effects for parties 
attempting to rely on contractual estoppel. As a result, it is submitted that the main 
significance of this question lies with those trying to assert some sort of a unified law of 
estoppel. But even this is an exercise that at least some writers regard as a "failure" 
anyway, for reasons far broader than the emergence of contractual estoppel, including 
the "inconsistencies" between proprietary estoppel and other types, and a general 
movement by the courts "towards a further divided and fractured series of discrete 
estoppels".90 Against this background, there is no consensus about how contractual 
estoppel fits in: Wilkins and Ghaly describe contractual estoppel as a "new and 
independent species of estoppel"91 and they also suggest that it is an "anomalous 
doctrine" along with estoppel by deed, the Panchaud Frères doctrine, and res judicata.92  
 
In short, modern estoppel seems fragmented rather than flexible. As a series of 
independent doctrines,  it can surely accommodate contractual estoppel's reliance on the 
"mechanism" of contract, as no more exceptional than, say, proprietary estoppel's 
substantive differences from other forms of estoppel93 or the absence of detrimental 
reliance from the requirements for estoppel by deed.94 Furthermore, it has been noted 
that freedom of contract and party autonomy are regarded by the Privy Council as 
                                                 
89 [1982] Q.B. 84; [1981] 3 All E.R. 577, at 122. 
90 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at pp. 86-89.  
91 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at p. 90.  
92 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at pp. 10-11.  
93 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at p. 87. 
94 It was not considered in the course of confirming that estoppel by deed arose in Prime Sight Ltd v 
Lavarello [2014] A.C. 436. The absence of this requirement is discussed, though not wholly endorsed by 
Wilken and Ghaly. S. Wilken and K. Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 3rd edn. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), at pp. 294-296.  
15 
 
underpinning both estoppel by deed and estoppel by convention, and contractual 
estoppel fits easily into this analysis. However, what really matters, for commercial 
parties at least, is that, in light of the cases considered in this part of the paper, the 
problems associated with categorisation do not offer any persuasive means to challenge 
contractual estoppel itself. Therefore, with some justification, but little real consequence 
for litigants, the "estoppel" label looks set to stick.   
 
IV. Implications 
 
A central point to note when considering the implications of contractual estoppel is that 
the doctrine does not operate in a vacuum, but as a means of holding parties to their 
particular statements. For that reason, as Stanley Burnton L.J. put it in Axa Sun Life plc v 
Campbell Martin Ltd, when considering the effects of an entire agreement clause, "it is not 
necessarily helpful to rely on the judgments on differently worded provisions."95 It 
follows that any implications of the doctrine will entirely depend on the words used by 
the parties. This was vividly demonstrated in Camerata Property v Credit Suisse Securities 
(Europe) Ltd, where the judge found that contractual estoppel did arise, but also that the 
agreements provided that the statements in question had only been given for the narrow 
purpose of allowing the bank to make them when it acted on the investor's behalf, and 
about a state of affairs at a particular point in time.96 As a result, they did not protect the 
bank from the claims being brought by the investor.  
 
That said, the majority of reported contractual estoppel cases to date, including the 
pivotal cases considered above, relate to certain, widely-used provisions. This drafting is 
designed to protect one (or, in the case of derivatives, both)97 parties from claims for 
misrepresentation and, sometimes, breach of collateral warranty. So, for example, the 
"Relevant Provisions" in Raiffeisen included clauses in the Facility Agreement whereby the 
Existing Lender: 
 
"makes no representation or warranty and assumes no responsibility to [RZB] 
for: (i) the legality, validity, effectiveness, adequacy or enforceability of the 
Finance Documents or any other documents … (iv) the accuracy of any 
statements (whether written or oral) made in or in connection with any Finance 
Document or any other documents, and any representations or warranties 
implied by law are excluded."98 
 
Contractual estoppel is controversial in this context, because it can be read as 
complicating an important, but already piecemeal, set of legal rules, and potentially 
skewing them in favour of the representee. It has been alleged that contractual estoppel 
allows draftsmen to create a "virtual reality" so that the substance of "actual 
negotiations" may be ignored.99 Given the prevalence of such clauses, their significance 
in the contractual estoppel case law and the criticism of the effects of contractual 
                                                 
95 [2011] EWCA Civ 133; [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, at [35]. 
96 [2011] EWHC 479 (Comm); [2011] 2 B.C.L.C. 54, at [183]-[184]. 
97 For example, in a derivatives contract net payments may flow from A to B or vice versa over the life the 
contract, depending on the performance of the underlying rate. Accordingly, the contract will not 
distinguish between the parties, and defensive drafting will apply equally to both.   
98 Clause 22.4(a) of the Facility Agreement, cited at Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland 
[2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [229].  
99 G. McMeel, "Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: The myth of contractual estoppel" 
[2011] L.M.C.L.Q. 185, at 188. 
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estoppel in this context, it is instructive to consider in detail the implications of 
contractual estoppel in this area of law.  
 
1. Types of "basis" clauses?  
 
In practice, defensive drafting in commercial contracts often weaves together different 
ways of minimising parties' potential liability. However, to assist discussion of the 
implications of contractual estoppel, three widely adopted types of provisions are 
separately considered below.  
 
(a) No responsibility 
 
These provisions attempt to establish that no duty arises as between the parties, including 
fiduciary duties or a duty of care. Clear-cut examples of this type of clause may be found 
across the banking sector. As decided in Springwell, banks and their customers may agree 
that no advisory duty is to arise or has arisen in the past; Lord Hodge, citing Springwell in 
the course of his judgment in Grant Estates, stated that such wording "defines the basis of 
[the parties'] trading or banking relationship and allocates risk in a way which negates any 
possibility of a general or specific advisory duty coming into existence."100 The effect of 
contractual estoppel in this context is that such a clause will bar the customer from 
alleging he was given advice and relied upon it, regardless of what happened in "actual 
reality".101 Contractual estoppel also allows parties to acknowledge no such duty arose 
prior to the contract, thereby defining the basis on which they entered into their dealings.   
 
Springwell has been widely cited on this point, and, overall, there is now a line of cases 
suggesting that, in the banking context at least, such terms will be held to define the 
parties' relationship, and consequently, the terms will fall outside UCTA. In IFE Fund SA 
v Goldman Sachs International,102 the Court of Appeal considered an investment fund which 
had bought corporate bonds from a bank (GSI), and was alleging that the bank had made 
implied representations and owed it a duty of care. Waller L.J., with whom the other 
judges agreed, stated that, on the terms between the parties, "[n]othing could be clearer 
than that GSI were not assuming any responsibility to the participants".103 In Titan Steel 
Wheels v Royal Bank of Scotland plc,104 it was similarly held that such terms addressed the 
"scope of the service to be provided".105 In recent cases, the courts have continued to 
uphold such "basis" terms robustly; in litigation arising out of the LIBOR scandal, the 
Court held that the standard provisions of a transaction (a termsheet and swap 
documentation) could preclude a duty of care from arising, even if a dishonest 
misrepresentation was alleged.106 At first instance in Springwell, Gloster J. said that the 
danger of the reverse was that "every contract term which contains contractual terms 
defining the extent of each party's obligations would have to satisfy the requirement of 
reasonableness".107 
 
                                                 
100 Grant Estates Ltd v RBS 2012 G.W.D. 29-588, at [73], cited in Barclays Bank v Svizera Holdings BV [2015] 
1 All E.R. (Comm) 788, at [69]. 
101 Grant Estates Ltd 2012 G.W.D. 29-588, at [73]-[74]. 
102 [2007] EWCA Civ 811; [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449. 
103 IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449, at [28]. 
104 [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92 
105 Titan Steel Wheels v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92, at [104]. 
106 Deutsche Bank v Unitech [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 268, at [156]. 
107 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [602]. 
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The classification of such terms will, however, be subject to review in each case, and 
outside the banking context, there is authority that they may be found to be exclusion 
clauses. In Avrora, the court considered drafting purporting to preclude an auction 
house's responsibility for the attribution of a painting. In deciding whether a term was an 
attempt to prevent or to exclude liability for negligence, Newey J. stated that "[t]here is 
surely scope for argument about what distinguishes the two situations."108 The judge 
confirmed that all turns on the specific language and the context, which go to deciding if 
responsibility was assumed in the first place.109 It was held in Avrora that approach of 
Aikens L.J. in Springwell to the application of section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act to a 
"no representation" clause110 was relevant to establishing whether the denial of 
responsibility for negligence in this case would come within section 2 of UCTA. On this 
basis, the test applied was whether the clause aims "to rewrite history or parts company 
with reality". The judge found that "Christie's had taken responsibility for the 
attribution"111 of the painting, so the drafting was found to be an attempt to exclude 
liability. It should be noted, however, that it would have been difficult for the auction 
house to argue otherwise, because it had expressly given the buyer a Limited Warranty to 
that effect.112 This contextual factor, normally absent in the banking setting, and certainly 
absent in Springwell, helps to distinguish these two lines of cases for the time being.  
 
(b) No representations and no reliance 
 
Other now common provisions attempt to establish that no representations have made, 
either at all, or outside of those included in the contract, and that there has been no 
reliance on any representations. So, for example, in Avrora, the terms of the auction 
house's Conditions included the following: 
  
"Except as stated in the Limited Warranty in paragraph 6 above, all property is 
sold 'as is' without any representation or warranty of any kind by Christie's or the 
seller."113  
 
"Non-reliance" clauses are often woven together with these acknowledgements of "no 
representations". The former are usually drafted on the lines that "any such 
representations have not been relied on by the other party, even if they both know that 
such representations have in fact been made or relied on".114 The origins of these clauses 
were discussed in EA Grimstead, where Chadwick L.J. cited Jacob J in Thomas Witter,115 
who identified the "genesis of such clauses" as:  
 
"remarks of Mr Justice Browne-Wilkinson in Alman and another v Associated 
Newspapers Group Limited (unreported, 20 June 1980) that: 
If it [the entire agreement clause which he was considering] were 
designed to exclude liability for misrepresentation it would, I think, have 
to be couched in different terms, for example, a clause acknowledging 
                                                 
108 Avrora Fine Arts Investment v Christie, Manson & Woods [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [141].  
109 Avrora Fine Arts Investment [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [127]. 
110 This in turn referenced Christopher Clarke J.'s judgment in Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of 
Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, as discussed in the next section. 
111 Avrora Fine Arts Investment v Christie, Manson & Woods [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [144]. 
112 Avrora Fine Arts Investment [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [146]. 
113 Avrora Fine Arts Investment [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [122]. 
114 Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino SpA v Barclays Bank [2011] 1 C.L.C. 701, at [505]. 
115 Thomas Witter v TBP Industries [1996] 2 All E.R. 573; Independent, 8 August 1994. 
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that the parties had not relied on any misrepresentations in entering into 
the contract."116 
 
EA Grimstead held that binding a party to such a statement would be a matter of 
evidential estoppel, however, as already discussed, Springwell confirmed that contractual 
estoppel may arise to hold parties to these no representation and non-reliance clauses. 
One commentator regards this as redressing a "mischief" by finally putting "non-reliance 
clauses on the same footing with entire agreement clauses", as discussed further below.117 
The effect in Springwell was decisive: the investor was contractually estopped from 
arguing that that there were any actionable representations made by the bank.118 
Subsequently, this element of the decision has been widely applied, for example in the 
recent case of Barclays v Svizera Holdings, which considered a non-reliance clause in a 
Mandate Letter for a syndicated loan. Here, Peekay, Springwell and Cassa di Risparmio were 
cited as a line of authority that "the party may be contractually estopped from alleging 
that he relied upon a representation in entering the contract."119  
 
In Barclays v Svizera Holdings, the borrower's argument that this drafting should be struck 
down under sections 3 and 11 of UCTA was described as "hopeless".120 However, 
compared to the "no responsibility" line of authority considered above, there seems 
much more room for debate within the cases about whether this type of drafting falls 
under UCTA. It was assumed, but not decided, in EA Grimstead that UCTA would apply, 
via section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act, because the drafting was found to be "terms 
which exclude any remedy available to a party to a contract by reason of a pre-
contractual misrepresentation".121 Going on to consider this reasonableness requirement, 
it was held to be "wholly fair and reasonable" for the purchaser's remedies to be limited. 
The judge noted that the courts should not refuse to give effect to "an acknowledgement 
of non-reliance in a commercial contract between experienced parties of equal bargaining 
strength – a fortiori, where those parties have the benefit of professional advice." This was 
for two reasons; upholding the parties' intention to avoid the uncertainty of litigation 
over "oral discussions at pre-contractual meetings"; and because the price would have 
reflected the risk that the parties had agreed to take. 122   
 
In later cases, the question of whether language excludes or prevents liability has been 
determined by construing the substantive effect of the clause in light of the parties' 
dealings. In Raiffeisen, in part of the judgment already touched upon above, the question 
of whether certain provisions excluded or restricted liability for misrepresentation and 
therefore fell under section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act was found to turn on 
"whether the clause attempts to rewrite history or parts company with reality." 
Christopher Clarke J. distinguished cases where:  
 
"sophisticated commercial parties agree, in terms of which they are both aware, 
to regulate their future relationship by prescribing the basis on which they will be 
dealing with each other and what representations they are or are not making, a 
suitably drafted clause may properly be regarded as establishing that no 
                                                 
116 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan Info. T.L.R. 384, at 411.  
117 A. Trukhtanov, "Exclusion of liability for pre-contractual misrepresentation: A setback" (2011) 127 
L.Q.R. 345, 349.  
118 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [171].  
119 Barclays Bank v Svizera Holdings BV [2015] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 788, at [58].  
120 Barclays Bank [2015] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 788, at [61].  
121 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan  Info. T.L.R. 384, at 413. 
122 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd Info. T.L.R. 384, at 413. 
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representations (or none other than honest belief) are being made or are intended 
to be relied on […]" 
 
with the situation where: 
 
 "to tell the man in the street that the car you are selling him is perfect and then 
agree that the basis of your contract is that no representations have been made or 
relied on, may be nothing more than an attempt retrospectively to alter the 
character and effect of what has gone on before, and in substance an attempt to 
exclude or restrict liability."123  
 
In this case, the judge went on to hold that the terms being relied upon by the bank "did 
not attempt to exclude or restrict any liability" but rather this was the parties agreeing the 
"ambit" of their deal.124 As a result, UCTA was not relevant. In Springwell, Aikens L.J. 
reached a different conclusion applying Christopher Clarke J.'s analysis to certain of the 
Relevant Provisions. This first stage of this process in Springwell involved construing the 
provisions in detail. For example, Aikens L.J. stated "I agree with Gloster J. that the 
penultimate sentence of paragraph 4 and the last part of the single sentence that makes 
up paragraph 6 of the DDCS letters are exemption clauses".125 Where the effect of the 
drafting was difficult to categorise, notwithstanding the first Raiffeisen extract above, the 
second extract was applied as a test. Thus, part of a clause which provided that "no 
representation or warranty, express or implied, is or will be made … in or in relation to 
such documents or information" was found to be "an attempt retrospectively to alter the 
character and effect of what has gone before" and thus it fell within section 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act, and the UCTA reasonableness regime. The provision was later 
found to be reasonable, given the sophistication and knowledge of the investor. As a 
result the bank could rely on this exemption from liability for both negligent 
misstatement and misrepresentation under section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act.126  
 
To sum up, contractual estoppel has transformed a party's ability to use no 
representation and non-reliance drafting as a defence to claims for misrepresentation, 
because the previous requirements of evidential estoppel were nearly insuperable in this 
context. At the same time, however, this has opened up such drafting to detailed 
interpretation both to determine its exact effects and whether the UCTA requirements of 
reasonableness apply. This case-by-case scrutiny may be seen as an inevitable part of an 
estoppel that arises from the words used by the parties. Moreover, where UCTA is held 
to apply, the implications for commercial parties are not, on the evidence to date, 
onerous. For a start, parties' other acknowledgments may give rise to an estoppel which 
effectively puts this matter beyond doubt (e.g., arising from acknowledgements of 
sophistication), while a host of contextual factors already point in this direction. For 
example, in Avrora, the exclusion provisions were held to be reasonable because of a list 
of reasons, including that the buyer had other remedies available under the terms of the 
deal.127 In Springwell, matters relevant to the requirement of reasonableness had already 
                                                 
123 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [314]-[315].  
124 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 123, at [316]-[317].  
125 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [181]. 
126 Springwell Navigation Corp [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [184]. 
127 Avrora Fine Arts Investment [2012] P.N.L.R. 35, at [152]. See similar lists in Titan Steel Wheels v The Royal 
Bank of Scotland [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92 at [105], including that it "was open to Titan to choose any bank 
and indeed it did take its custom elsewhere"; in Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] 
EWHC 1785 (Comm); [2011] All E.R. (D) 113 (Jul), at [569], including that the term in that case was "in a 
standard form document produced by the industry body, ISDA, in the interests of all market participants 
20 
 
been decided in other parts of the judgment which, for example, established the 
sophistication of the parties. This meant that Aikens L.J.'s discussion and findings on 
UCTA reasonableness could be completed in a few short paragraphs.128 The only 
example in the contractual estoppel cases suggesting that such drafting would not meet 
the requirement of reasonableness is found in a decision arising out of the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers group, Camerata v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd. Here, the judge 
held that UCTA did not apply as the clauses in question were basis clauses. However, he 
went on to add that if it did, the requirements of reasonableness would not be met as the 
clauses were so "unclear and open to debate".129 In all the other decisions examined for 
this article the courts found that this type of provision safely met the UCTA requirement 
of reasonableness.  
 
(c) Entire agreement clauses 
 
Entire agreement clauses often feature in commercial contracts, alongside the clauses 
considered above. While these two types of provisions have traditionally received 
different treatment by the courts, a theme in the recent cases is that contractual estoppel 
has helped to bring about convergence in terms of their judicial treatment. 
 
The status and interpretation of entire agreement clauses is, of course, highly fact-
specific, but they have usually been treated by the courts as contractual terms. For 
example, in Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Ltd, Lightman J said that:  
 
"such a clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full 
contractual terms are to be found in the document containing the clause and not 
elsewhere, and that accordingly any promises or assurances made in the course of 
the negotiations (which in the absence of such a clause might have effect as a 
collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save in so far as they are 
reflected and given effect in that document." 130 
 
In the 2011 Court of Appeal decision in Axa Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd,131 
however, the parties agreed that contractual estoppel was the basis on which an entire 
agreement clause took effect in accordance with its terms (though the defendants 
reserved their rights on this point for any appeal).132 Similarly, in a recent appeal from a 
first instance decision to refuse an application to strike out a claim,133 one of the points 
considered by the Court of Appeal was whether contractual estoppel arose from a very 
simply drafted entire agreement clause and, if so, whether it had the effect of barring a 
claim based on prior representations and estoppels.134 In Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation135 Hamblen J held that an entire agreement clause incorporating a 
                                                                                                                                            
and end-users, and has been used for almost 20 years."; and in Camerata v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd 
[2011] 2 B.C.L.C. 54, , at [169]. 
128 Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, at [183]-[186]. 
129 [2011] 2 B.C.L.C. 54, at [187]. 
130 [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 611; [2000] 3 E.G.L.R. 31 at [7]. See, also considering an entire agreement clause, 
World Online Telecom Limited v I-Way Limited  [2002] EWCA Civ 413; [2002] All E.R. (D) 114 (Mar), at [10], 
per Sedley L.J.: "In a case like the present, the parties have made their own law by contracting and, in 
principle, can make or unmake it." 
131 [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1.  
132 Axa Sun Life plc [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, at [34].  
133 Mears Ltd v Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2013] C.P. Rep. 39. 
134 Mears Ltd [2013] C.P. Rep. 39, at [17]. 
135 [2011] All E.R. (D) 113 (Jul), at [567]. (This point was not raised on appeal).  
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non-reliance provision took effect "if necessary" because of contractual estoppel, thereby 
preventing claims based on any non-fraudulent representations, while a recent first 
instance decision also described Springwell as giving "legal efficacy" to entire agreement 
clauses.136 In this respect, there seems to be convergence between the legal justifications 
for the effects of non-reliance and entire agreement clauses.  
 
That said, the case law on entire agreement clauses has focused much more on the 
interpretation of particular terms, and related issues like the capacity of parties to vary 
them by oral agreement.137 In Axa Sun Life138 the Court of Appeal held that a particular 
entire agreement clause did not cover misrepresentations, and was limited to excluding 
liability for breaches of collateral warranties. In the academic literature, this construction 
of the clause in Axa Sun Life has been criticised for being a "setback" from the courts' 
previous "business-friendly approach".139 In practice, this may be offset by an 
accompanying non-reliance clause, but the recent case of UBS AG v Kommunale 
Wasserwerke Leipzig140 demonstrates how a claim for misrepresentation may still be 
possible, even where derivatives documents contained versions of both such clauses. 
Here, following Axa Sun Life, the entire agreement clause in the parties' ISDA Master 
Agreement was found not to cover representations, while the non-reliance provision in 
the swap confirmation was limited to statements made as investment advice or 
recommendations. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Axa Sun Life held that the UCTA requirement of reasonableness 
did apply to the entire agreement clause in that case. On the face of it, this could be seen 
as surprising, as even Stanley Burnton L.J., before applying the test, stated that "[a]n 
entire agreement clause such as clause 24 is not an exemption clause of the kind with 
which UCTA was and is principally concerned."141 Moreover, the clause clearly prevented 
collateral warranties coming into existence, rather than excluding liability for them, which 
meant that section 3(2)(a) of UCTA did not apply. However, it was held that section 
3(2)(b)(i) of UCTA did apply here, because the objective of the clause might have been, 
in some circumstances, to allow a party to render performance substantially different to 
that which was expected of them, though the judge did not go on to explain in detail 
how this analysis applied on the facts of this case. In a separate debate about the 
enforceability of, and limits to, "conclusive evidence" clauses in commercial loan 
contracts, it has been suggested that the "unfortunately drafted" section 3(2)(b)(i) may 
apply there too.142 In other words, it seems that this section of UCTA is being called 
upon to mitigate the effects of different types of commercial arrangements which 
purport to provide conclusivity, but in practice may prove to be uncomfortably harsh.  
 
Going on to apply the UCTA requirements, Stanley Burnton L.J. found that Axa's entire 
agreement clause was reasonable, notwithstanding the different in size between Axa and 
                                                 
136 Matchbet Ltd v Openbet Ltd [2013] EWHC 3067 (Ch); [2013] All E.R. (D) 150 (Oct), at [132].  
137 E.g., see Energy Venture Partners v Malabu Oil and Gas Ltd [2013] EWHC 2118 (Comm); [2013] All E.R. 
(D) 347 (Jul), at [271]-[274]. 
138 Axa Sun Life plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 
139 A. Trukhtanov, "Exclusion of liability for pre-contractual misrepresentation: A setback" (2011) 127 
L.Q.R. 345, at 349. 
140 [2014] EWHC 3615 (Comm); [2014] All E.R. (D) 47 (Nov), at [773]-[783]. These points were 
considered in the alternative, as the bank's representations were found to be fraudulent, in which case 
entire agreement and non-reliance clauses "cannot assist", at [773].  
141 Axa Sun Life plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, at [49]. 
142 S.A. Booysen, ""Pay now-argue later" Conclusive evidence clauses in commercial loan contracts" [2014] 
Journal of Business Law 31, at 42.  
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its counterparties, and the fact these were Axa's standard terms. The Court placed weight 
on the fact that the defendants should have read and understood the terms and that both 
sides benefitted from the resultant "certainty as to the terms of their contract"143 and 
reduced likelihood of litigation. This is consistent with the courts' approach to the 
reasonableness of other drafting considered in this part of the paper.  
 
(d) Conclusions 
 
On this analysis, what difference has contractual estoppel made to these types of 
defensive drafting in commercial contracts? 
 
First, and most significantly, it has provided a new means by which parties will be bound 
by no responsibility, non-reliance and no representation provisions. This stops various 
types of claims from arising, including, most often, for misrepresentation. Previously, this 
effect would have required evidential or another form of estoppel, which, as EA 
Grimstead demonstrated, was almost impossible to show in this context.  
 
Secondly, contractual estoppel has brought about what seems sensible convergence 
between the law around clauses designed to prevent liability for misrepresentation and 
entire agreement clauses. This is because contractual estoppel now equips the former 
with the legal weight traditionally given to the latter. Convergence is also evident where 
contractual estoppel is mentioned as a means of holding parties to entire agreement 
clauses.  
 
Thirdly, it is now clear that, where contractual estoppel is alleged to arise, the courts have 
to carefully consider how to interpret the underlying clauses, their effects, and the related 
question of statutory controls. In particular, it is now routine for courts considering such 
drafting to have to address arguments about whether it is a "basis" or exclusion clause, 
and whether it is subject to the requirement of reasonableness in UCTA. Seen in 
overview, some decisions about whether UCTA applies in this context seem hard to 
reconcile, but this is because they have to be made on a case-by-case basis, and because, 
as the courts have acknowledged, the statute was not written with clauses such as "entire 
agreement" terms in mind. While it is still the case that the "legislation is, in practice, of 
very limited application in the cases of commercial contracts between commercial 
counterparties"144 it is submitted that, when there are close calls to make, the courts seem 
prepared to err on the side of finding a way to apply the UCTA reasonableness 
requirement. In the end, this had no substantive impact on the outcome of any case 
considered here: with the exception of the obiter comments about the bank's terms that 
lacked clarity, all the terms considered in these cases were found to be reasonable.  
 
The real significance of applying the requirement of reasonableness, therefore, lies 
elsewhere. It is that these cases demonstrate how, notwithstanding the rise of boilerplate 
terms made binding by contractual estoppel, provisions may still be the subject of review. 
It is submitted that this possibility is very significant, especially for consumers and non-
sophisticated counterparties for whom UCTA remains an important, if imperfect, 
safeguard in the face of drafting that may otherwise eviscerate ways of enforcing rights.  
 
2. Contractual estoppel in other contexts 
 
                                                 
143 Axa Sun Life plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, at [64].  
144 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] All E.R. (D) 167 (Jun), at [603]. 
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Recent decisions applying Springwell and Peekay reveal examples of innovative arguments 
in various new contexts. The fate of the more extreme of these arguments should serve 
to reassure those who worry that contractual estoppel will have sweeping effects outside 
the financial markets. However, there are also signs of the difficult questions which lie 
ahead. 
 
(a) Good faith and reasonableness 
 
Even though there is no over-arching duty of good faith in English law, we have already 
seen how contractual estoppel can deny a party access to the "piecemeal solutions"145 that 
are available instead, such as an action for misrepresentation. However, contractual 
estoppel may have a more direct effect on this area of law, because it is possible that it 
might arise from an acknowledgement that a certain state of affairs was reasonable or 
that certain matters were conducted in good faith.  
 
To date, there are two first instance cases which touch on this issue. In Dinsdale Moorland 
Services Ltd v Evans,146 the High Court in Leeds was asked to consider the effectiveness of 
a restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a company and its managing 
director. Counsel for the company submitted that the following part of the "complicated 
and long" restrictive covenant clause, gave rise to an estoppel: 
 
"[The Managing Director] agrees that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the restrictions contained in this clause are reasonable and necessary for the 
protection of [the company] and that they do not bear harshly upon him […]"147 
 
Counsel argued that the principles in Springwell "apply just as much to a covenant in an 
employment contract as they do to a pre-contractual misrepresentation".148 Counsel 
added that, as per Springwell, the parties in this matter were of equal bargaining power. 
The Court decline to agree, and held that summary judgment could not be awarded on 
the basis of estoppel. Having explained that "[t]he law relating to such covenants 
depends on public policy […]"149 Behrens J. held that this requirement could not be 
sidestepped by contractual estoppel, stating "[i]t seems to me to be by no means fanciful 
to suggest that the parties cannot themselves agree that such a clause is reasonable in the 
public interest."150  
 
Dinsdale Moorland Services involved a special type of contractual term, which is expressly 
regulated by the common law in order to protect employees. Rejection of the employer's 
argument was therefore consistent with the express limits to contractual estoppel, namely 
that it arises subject to public policy and contrary legal rules. However, in other cases, 
especially those involving two commercial parties disputing an "ordinary" type of term, 
the courts may be willing to accept that contractual estoppel may arise to bind a party to 
an acknowledgement of good faith. In Charles Shaker  v Vistajet Group Holding SA,151 the 
                                                 
145
 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 Q.B. 433; [1988] 1 All E.R. 348, at 439, 
per Bingham L.J. 
146 [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217. 
147 Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd v Evans [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217, at [8], reproducing clause 20.5 of the 
employment contract.  
148 Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217, at [39]. 
149 Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217, at [40] citing Office Angels v Rainer-Thomas [1991] 
I.R.L.R. 214; The Times, 15 April 1991.  
150 Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd v Evans [2014] 2 Costs L.R. 217, at [41]. 
151
 [2012] EWHC 1329 (Comm); [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1010.  
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Claimant, the prospective buyer of an aircraft, applied for summary judgment on a claim 
for the return of a deposit paid pursuant to the terms of a Letter of Intent ("LOI"). The 
Defendant argued that, contrary to the LOI, the Claimant had failed "to proceed in good 
faith and to use reasonable endeavours" in order to produce and agree certain 
documents. Summary judgment was awarded to the Claimant on the basis that there was 
"no doubt" that this obligation in the LOI "does not give rise to an enforceable 
obligation in law".152 In the alternative, however, the court considered the parties' 
amendment to the LOI, in which the parties "acknowledge that, notwithstanding the 
exercise of good faith and reasonable endeavours by all relevant parties" the documents 
would not be ready by the original deadline. The judge held that this acknowledgement 
was "clear and unambiguous" and contractual estoppel could arise from it.153 Citing 
Raiffeisen, Peekay and Springwell, Teare J. held that an "acknowledgment" of this state of 
affairs could give rise to a contractual estoppel, and that this outcome was backed-up by 
the fact "the commercial sense of the amendment is clear".154 As a result, the judge held 
that the Defendant was estopped from contending that the Claimant had failed to act in 
good faith or exercise reasonable endeavours before the date of this amendment. 
 
We may infer that, should the English law ever change to recognise duties such as good 
faith in pre-contractual negotiations, acknowledgments like those in Charles Shaker might 
severely limit the practical effects of such a change. This conclusion does not necessarily 
undermine the arguments in favour of such a duty, any more than Springwell undermines 
the arguments for a duty to advise arising in appropriate cases. But those debating 
Walford v Miles155 should realise that a reversal would, amongst other effects, incentivise 
draftsmen to make the most of contractual estoppel. This finding highlights the 
importance of having clear and widely understood limits to contractual estoppel, whether 
imposed by statute, or by public policy, as already recognised in the context of 
contractual statements made to an employer.  
 
(b) Capacity  
 
Contractual estoppel cannot alter a statutory body (including a company)'s legal capacity 
to take certain actions, and nor may it make valid a contract that is ultra vires or 
otherwise void for reasons of public policy.156 Yet, it has been held that contractual 
estoppel may arise from acknowledgements of validity in framework contracts, thereby 
assisting banks facing an exposure because derivatives transactions agreed to subject to 
that framework are found to be ultra vires a public sector counterparty. This implication 
of contractual estoppel may prove to be very significant in practice, not least because so 
many of the derivatives being energetically disputed by foreign public authorities are 
governed by English law and subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.157   
 
Contractual estoppel proved helpful to the bank in the early stages of Merrill Lynch v 
Commune di Verona.158 In this case, the English court granted the bank an order making 
various declarations, certain of which reflected representations made by the defendant in 
derivatives documentation, including that the deal was "valid and binding". The court 
                                                 
152 Charles Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1010, at [7].  
153 Charles Shaker [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1010, at [22]. 
154 Charles Shaker [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1010, at [25].  
155 [1992] 2 A.C. 128; [1992] 1 All E.R. 453. 
156 As considered in Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [304].  
157 One of two default choices in the ISDA Master Agreement, the other being N.Y. law and the 
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158 [2012] EWHC 1407, unreported (22 May 2012), at [28]-[29]. 
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held, because of contractual estoppel, the defendant could not deny the truth of these 
statements, and it was prepared to make the order on that basis.  
 
These acknowledgements of validity were considered much more fully in 2014, in 
another derivatives dispute between an investment bank and quasi-public authority. The 
main part of the decision in Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep159 found that a 
Dutch housing authority did not have capacity to enter several disputed derivatives 
transactions, because they were speculative and not part of a hedging strategy. Crucially, 
it was held that these transactions were ultra vires and therefore void, but that the over-
arching Master Agreement remained valid.160 This meant that contractual estoppel could 
still arise from acknowledgements in the Master Agreement; as clearly established in the 
pivotal cases, it could not have arisen had there been no valid contract.  
 
Having reached this decision, Andrew Smith J. went on to consider the legal status of 
various provisions in the (valid) Master Agreement and the "Additional Representations" 
in the Schedule to it, including Vestia's statement that it would be in compliance with its 
articles of association when it entered into transactions. Finding that the latter were 
intended to be contractual warranties, the judge held that contractual estoppel could arise 
where the parties have made "an agreement about a state of affairs in the future".161 
Going on to interpret the words of this "compliance provision", the judge found that the 
parties intended this drafting to mean that future transactions should not be invalid 
because of capacity. It followed that the compliance provision was clearly intended to 
cover ultra vires transactions. If it applied only where there was a valid contract, it would 
"be to attribute an absurd intention to the parties."162  
 
As a result, the bank was allowed to enforce the Master Agreement as if the ultra vires 
contracts were valid, while Vestia could not dispute their liability to the bank under the 
Master Agreement on the grounds that the contracts were outside their capacity.163 This 
meant that the bank could claim the contractually defined Early Termination Amount, or 
recover damages for that amount.164 Because of contractual estoppel arising from these 
provisions, there was no need to rely on restitution for unjust enrichment to recover the 
sums outstanding, as had been the case in earlier public authority cases involving 
derivatives.165  
 
This aspect of the Vestia decision is significant for two reasons. First, where transactions 
are found to be ultra vires, it affords the derivatives counterparty a contractual damages-
based remedy. The sum due under the Master Agreement on Early Termination is 
defined therein, and to that extent, it is more predictable than a claim in restitution. Nor 
is such recovery subject to defences like a change of position. It has been suggested that 
                                                 
159 [2015] Bus. L.R. D5.  
160 Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [314].  
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162 Credit Suisse International [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [315].  
163 Credit Suisse International [2015] Bus. L.R. D5, at [319]-[320].  
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Haugesund Kommune v Depfa A.C.S. Bank, Wikborg Rein & Co [2011] EWCA Civ 33; [2011] 3 All E.R. 655, 
an action by a bank against its law firm, to try to recover the shortfall in its losses after derivatives with a 
Norwegian municipality were declared ultra vires. The bank's claim in restitution is discussed at [22]-[27].  
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an action for restitution would "often" recover "much less that then contractual 
measure" in this context.166 Secondly, this decision promises to have knock-on effects 
upon the drafting of derivatives deals and more broadly, because it represents what 
practitioners have referred to as "a way in which banks can try to draft their way out of 
capacity problems, which have previously been (in effect) a legal risk which could not be 
mitigated contractually."167 Specifically, this is because the decision makes it possible for 
the parties to warrant that they will have the capacity to enter all future transactions 
under the Master Agreement. In this way, Credit Suisse International, like other cases 
confirming that contractual estoppel arises from particular provisions, is a striking 
example of the symbiotic relationship between the courts and the contents of 
commercial contracts.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Despite allegations to the contrary, contractual estoppel is not revolutionary, nor is it 
about parties being estopped from basing claims on the truth. Contractual estoppel is a 
means of preventing parties from contracting on one basis and litigating on another. As 
such, it is about parties being estopped from denying a version of events that they 
previously agreed to, whether or not that version of events was true. 
 
Tracing the origins of the doctrine shows it to be a hybrid of authority and freedom of 
contract. This helps us understand that it is no accident that contractual estoppel has 
come to the fore in the last seven years or so, against a backdrop of spectacular volatility 
in the financial markets. Looking over these cases shows that exogenous market factors 
have played a part in shaping contractual estoppel as we now know it. This matters not 
only as a historical note, but substantively too. Cases about complex financial contracts 
entered into by sophisticated clients, whom the public sector has chosen to exclude from 
the safety net of financial regulation, suit a muscular version freedom of contract. 
Contractual estoppel is not the only area of law to be shaped by these exogenous factors, 
but, unlike areas including the anti-deprivation principle, it has potentially universal 
application. However appropriate it is for the financial markets, this makes the limits to 
the doctrine crucial.  
 
We are starting to see such limits applied and developed in the cases. Over the course of 
recent cases applying Springwell and Peekay, the courts have effectively established that 
there are two types of limits to contractual estoppel. First, there are the "internal" 
limitations of the parties' own words, which will be closely scrutinised by the courts in 
order to define the estoppel which arises. In recent decisions, the courts have spelt out to 
over-ambitious litigants that Springwell does not mean that any old drafting will give rise 
to an estoppel blocking a claimants' claims. We have already seen contractual estoppel 
limited by scope, time and purpose, all because of the parties' own choice of words.  
 
                                                 
166 Dentons, "Early termination payment calculated under ISDA Master Agreement enforced against quasi-
public body lacking capacity" (16 October 2014) Practice note, available at  
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2014/october/16/early-termination-payment-calculated-
under-isda-master-agreement (last visited 19 January 2015).  
167 Dentons, "Early termination payment calculated under ISDA Master Agreement enforced against quasi-
public body lacking capacity" (16 October 2014) Practice note, available at  
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2014/october/16/early-termination-payment-calculated-
under-isda-master-agreement.   
27 
 
After defining the nature of the estoppel, the courts apply the better-known "external" 
limits, based on public policy and statute. How these work in the classic context of 
defensive drafting in financial deals is now fairly well understood, though the courts still 
have to make difficult calls on particular provisions. It is submitted that, to date, they 
have erred on the side of caution, by finding borderline clauses to be exclusionary, with 
the implication that they will be subject to statutory controls. This is as it should be, in 
the case of a doctrine which is potentially so sweeping in its effects.  
 
The implications of contractual estoppel outside of the financial context have yet to take 
shape. There have been no reported consumer cases involving contractual estoppel, only 
one employment case and very few cases involving individuals. Yet, history suggests that 
it is only a matter of time before both draftsmen and litigants from outside the financial 
markets seek to capitalise on the cases discussed in this article. When they do, they will 
inevitably test, sharpen and help to develop both types of limits to contractual estoppel. 
As is already indicated by the cases, protecting parties to "everyday" types of contracts is 
possible, but it will depend on these internal and external limits, rather than on 
challenging contractual estoppel itself.  
